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1 :  
In his ‘Deep Inconsistency’ (2002a), Eklund attacks arguments to the effect
that some contradictions are true, and especially those based on the liar para-
dox, to be found in Priest (1987)—hereafter, IC. The point of this paper is to
evaluate his case.1
Eklund’s argument turns on the distinction between being analytic and be-
ing meaning-constitutive (). He explains the distinction as follows (p. 322):
. . . we should distinguish between the property of being meaning-
constitutive in the sense of being true by virtue of meaning and the
property of being meaning-constitutive in the sense that anyone
fully competent with the expressions employed, in virtue of her
competence, is disposed to accept them . . . Let us call principles . . .
[of the first kind] analytic, and reserve the label meaning-constitutive
for meaning constitutivity in the second sense.
Eklund contends that the principles that give rise to the liar paradox and
similar paradoxes of self-reference are , but not true, and a fortiori, not true
1In what follows, page references are to his article, unless otherwise indicated. We are grate-
ful to Eklund for comments on an earlier version of this paper.
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in virtue of meaning, not analytic. In other words, we may suppose that the
principles concerning truth that are  are inconsistent but not true.2 If this
is the case, arguments based on these principles collapse.
What are we to say about notions, such as truth, for which the  princi-
ples are inconsistent? In such cases (p. 322):
the semantic values of the expressions . . . [concerning the notion]
are what come closest to making the meaning-constitutive princi-
ples true.
The result will be consistent, according to Eklund, since no contradictions are
true. But the maximisation is not egalitarian: More weight should be given
to the holding of those principles that are more ‘firmly entrenched’, or ‘more
fundamental’ (ibid.). (For that reason, it might be better called ‘optimisation’
than ‘maximistation’.)
So much for an outline of Eklund’s position. Now for some of its problems.
2 ’ 
First, there are problems generated by Eklund’s distinction between analytic-
ity and meaning constitutivity. In Section 5 of his paper, Eklund points out
that the distinction cannot be maintained against what he calls a response-
dependent account of meaning, in which the truth of certain sentences just is
constituted by our dispositions to accept them. The distinction is defended at
greater length by Eklund in his (2002b), where, however, he himself notes that
it does not make sense against standard truth-conditional, conceptual role, or
Fregean semantics—at least when the semantic dispositions of speakers are
inconsistent. These accounts have to be modified, crucially, to allow for the
semantic dispositions to be fallible.
Let us consider these fallible dispositions. Call a disposition constitutive
of semantic competence an -disposition. The crucial question concerns what
accounts for these. Is it the case that:
1. a speaker posses -dispositions in virtue of a prior grasp of the facts of
meaning?
Or is it the case that:
2. a speaker’s possession of -dispositions is simply a brute fact of semantic
competence?
On the first answer, the fallibility of the dispositions seems to give rise to
absurdity. Let us illustrate with respect to truth and the T -schema, though the
2Eklund calls this ‘deep inconsistency’, but in the context, this is not a terribly appropriate
nomenclature since the given ‘inconsistency’ is of only a relatively superficial kind.
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point is quite general. The facts of meaning determine that some T -instances,
but only some, are analytic; the rest are false. Why, then, is it that a disposition
to accept all of them is constitutive of a grasp of meaning? Consider a speaker
who is disposed to accept the analytically true ones but not false ones. On
Eklund’s account, this is an incompetent speaker: they do not understand the
meaning of ‘true’! This is surely absurd. It is the speaker who is disposed to
endorse all of them whose grasp of meaning is less than perfect.
Eklund, we take it, does not accept 1, and wisely so, for the reason given.
But let us now turn to 2. According to this, a speaker does not have -
dispositions because of an independent grasp of meanings or, for that matter,
any special grasp of meaning at all. The -dispositions are simply brute facts
of semantic competence. But if we cannot appeal to an independent grasp
of meanings, we have a clear problem: How are -dispositions to be distin-
guished from dispositions that hold in virtue of mere belief. People, after all,
are disposed to accept many claims that would seem to have little to do with
semantic competence. Consider the disposition to accept that the world is older
than 1 minute. All competent speakers of the language—barring some malfunc-
tion that hinders competency—have that disposition. Why is that not an -
disposition? There would seem to be no principled reason for claiming that it
is not.3
There is no hope of drawing the distinction epistemologically. Most of the
dispositions that people have to accept things they have in virtue of being told.
But this is equally true of contingent claims, such as that Canberra is the capi-
tal of Australia, and analytic claims, such as that one is a number. Nor is there
any hope of drawing the requisite distinction simply in terms of behavioural
dispositions. The person who is inclined to accept that witches have inter-
course with the devil because this is true by definition and the person who
thinks that this is a true empirical fact is hard to discern. This, of course, is
one of the lessons of Quine’s celebrated ‘Two Dogmas of Empiricism’.4
Worse is in store for those who would subscribe to a theory of meaning
of the kind in question—to the effect that meanings supervene on our be-
havioural dipositions. It would appear to be an essential fact about meaning
that it is compositional. The meaning of a whole must be a function of the
meanings of the parts. But if the facts of meaning are determined by defeasi-
ble dispositions of speakers, there is absolutely no reason to suppose this to be
so. Not even the truth value of a sentence is determined by the truth values
of its parts. Thus, speakers may be disposed to accept that Sherlock Holmes
3Furthermore, if there’s no principled way to distinguish -dispositions from other disposi-
tions, then, since all people have different dispositions to assert, it follows that all people speak
different languages.
4One might suggest that a disposition is  just if we take it to be such. This will not
work either. It implies that speakers have an infallibility about meanings that they do not have.
Someone, for example, who takes the disposition to accept that pigs can fly to be  (of ‘pigs’)
is just plain wrong.
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was either right handed or left handed, without being disposed to accept either
that he was right handed or that he was left handed. There is therefore little
hope of explaining the compositionality of meaning.
In the present context, matters are even worse. Eklund requires not just a
behaviouristic account of meaning, but one that permits an optimisation pro-
cedure of the kind he has in mind. But the account queers the pitch for many
reasons. First, there is the problem of distinguishing between those things that
speakers are disposed to accept in virtue of semantic competence and those
that they are disposed to accept in virtue of mere belief. Next, however one
draws this distinction, it is almost certain that the relevant distinctions will
vary from person to person. Finally, on any reasonable behavioural criteria,
what a person accepts is likely to be a vague matter. How the optimisation
process is supposed to work in these contexts is, at the very least, a pressing
question for Eklund.
We do not rule out the possibility that the difficulties that we have been
pointing to can be given satisfactory answers, but the considerations show, at
least, that a lot more work needs to be done before Eklund’s crucial distinction
can fly.
As it turns out, though, this is all just softening up. For the major problems
of Eklund’s attack on dialetheism have nothing to do with his views about
meaning. For the sake of argument, let us grant for the rest of this paper that
they can be worked out in a satisfactory fashion.
3  
The major problem with Eklund’s paper is that it appears to rest on a simple
ignoratio. Eklund says (p. 323):
Priest’s argument is in effect rather simple. He defends each prin-
ciple made use of in the liar reasoning on the ground that the
meanings of the expression employed require that the principle
be true . . .
But that is just wrong.
It is true that in the introduction to IC (Chapter 0) it is claimed that the
T -schema and similar principles involved in the paradoxes of self-reference are
analytic. But analyticity is not necessary for the argument to true contradic-
tions: simple truth will do. And once the detailed arguments concerning the
liar paradox and its like are commenced in IC, analyticity plays no role at all.
(The term does not even occur in the index of the book!) Thus, in Chapter 1,
a set of conditions that entail contradiction (the Tarski conditions) is specified
and defended. These do not mention analyticity; and it is simply their truth
that is defended.
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That it is truth, not analyticity, that is important is flagged, in fact, even
in the introduction to IC, where it says that principles such as the T -schema
(IC, p. 5):
are a priori and, one might argue, analytic, specifying as they do
(at least in part) the defining conditions of the notions concerned.
At any rate, they are true. Now the point is that such principles,
possibly on their own, possibly with the connivance of other con-
tingent truths donated by the world, entail statements of the form:
α and not-α, which must therefore be true, entailment preserving
truth . . .
Discussions of analyticity are, therefore, beside the point.5
It should also be noted that the case for dialetheism in IC employs a num-
ber of arguments that have nothing to do with the paradoxes of self-reference;
for example, the arguments concerning change and motion in Chapters 9 and
10, and the legal and normative arguments of Chapter 11. Eklund claims that
his considerations apply to all of these (p. 326). But that is just false. For ex-
ample, in the legal case, it is not even plausible to suppose that the statements
that give rise to contradiction (e.g., that persons of a certain kind have the right
to do such and such—or that a duly constituted legislature has passed a law to
this effect) are analytic.
4 
As we have just observed, it is only the truth of the T -schema and similar prin-
ciples that is at issue, not its analyticity. There are many arguments for this
that have nothing to do with analyticity. For example, deflationists about truth
hold that the T -schema constitutes everything there is to be said about truth.
Some, it is true, have been tempted by the thought that one can get away with
making exceptions; but within the context of deflationism the idea seems en-
tirely unmotivated.6
Even if one is not a deflationist, there are reasons for accepting the truth
of the instances of the T -schema. One is the fact that we use truth as a dis-
quotational device to endorse what others say, even though we do not know
exactly what they say, or to endorse an infinite number of things in a finite
5Note that, strictly speaking, even the T -schema itself—though we (the authors) endorse it—
may not be necessary for the Liar-related arguments for dialetheism to go through. Even in the
conditional-free fragment of a language (and, hence, the T -schema-free fragment), ‘true’ might
work in such a way that the inferences from T〈A〉 to A (and back) are valid. In that fragment,
we have no T -schema (as the fragment is conditional-free) but may well have Liar-like sentences
that, given valid rules in the fragment, none the less result in true contradictions. So, not only is
analyticity not required, but even the T -schema itself is not strictly required. That said, our
chief response to Eklund’s ignoratio remains as above: only the truth, not the analyticity, of the
T -schema is required.
6See, e.g., Priest (2000), Beall and Armour-Garb (2003).
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way. Thus, we say The last words uttered by Newton are true, or Every sentence of the
form ‘Hegel believed thatA’ is true. If truth did not satisfy the T -schema such acts
would misfire.7 Eklund says nothing about such arguments. He does not even
say what his own account of truth is. In fact, he does not seem to think this a
particularly important issue. He tells us that given his view (p. 323):
the actual semantic values of the truth predicate and the logical
expressions can in principle be exactly what they are on more stan-
dard accounts of the liar; say Kripke’s (just to take an example).
This is exactly not the case. All standard accounts of truth, including Kripke’s,
run into problems of well known kinds (which, again, have nothing whatsoever
to do with analyticity, and so to which Eklund’s distinction is irrelevant). All
are subject, for example, to strengthened versions of the liar paradox. Thus,
if one takes it that the liar sentence is neither true nor false (as does Kripke),
then one has only to consider the sentence ‘This sentence is not true’. If it is
neither true nor false, it is not true, and so true. Moreover, there are reasons
as to why problems of this kind would seem to be inevitable. Such things are
well known and there is no need to dwell on them here.8 We note them only to
point out that what is needed to solve the liar paradox is an account of truth,
not of the meaning-theoretic status of its principles. Since Eklund does not
engage with this issue, there is, in a sense, nothing in his paper to answer.
It may be that the reason Eklund seems not to be too bothered about the
details of a theory of truth is that he takes it that the optimisation process
that determines what it is will ensure that it is consistent. Whether or not
this is so we will come to in a moment. Note, though, that even if this is the
case, it provides no reason to ignore the issue. Standard problems concerning
consistent accounts of truth (such as extended paradoxes) arise precisely because
truth is taken to be consistent. Recall Tarski’s Theorem.
Finally, it should be noted, Eklund’s failure to spell out an account of truth,
besides leaving him ‘out of the game’ (as it were), makes his own thesis prob-
lematic. Eklund’s chief claim—namely, that not all instances of the T -schema
are true—itself employs ‘true’. The consequences of that claim—what follows
from his chief claim—therefore turns on the theory of truth behind it. The
various standard theories differ, of course, with respect to what follows from
‘true’-ful claims (claims that use ‘true’). But, then, such standard theories may
well differ with respect to the consequences of Eklund’s chief claim. In that
respect, his failure to specify a particular theory of truth leaves Eklund’s chief
claim undefined.
7Of course, one might object that for such un-mentioning we need only the left-right-direction
of the T -schema. That’s true, but to make rationally warranted claims, one needs both directions.
After all, what, if not the right-left-direction (rld), is one’s warrant for asserting T〈A〉? The
warrant comes precisely from two sources: one’s warrant for A itself and the rld of the T -schema
(or, perhaps, some valid rule that, in effect, amounts to the rld of the T -schema).
8See, for example, Priest (1987), ch. 1 and Priest (1995), esp. part 3.
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5 
Let us now turn to Eklund’s claim that truth, whatever it turns out to be, is
consistent. As we noted in §??, he argues that a correct account of truth is
the one that comes closest to making the  principles true, that is, one that
maximally preserves the (relevantly weighted)  principles about the notion.
(There is, of course, no reason to suppose that such a theory is unique.) If
one assumes that the truth is consistent the result follows. But in this context,
one cannot simply assume that truth is consistent. As Eklund himself notes
(p. 323), the Law of Non-Contradiction () is but one principle (schema) that
is part of the data to be maximised. It may therefore fall in the optimisation
procedure.9
Eklund summarily dismisses the possibility that the result of the maximisa-
tion may be inconsistent, on the ground that the  is so well entrenched and
fundamental, and its weight in the optimisation procedure therefore so high,
that it is unlikely not be respected in the procedure. Thus (p. 331):
Although it is possible that the correctness of our . . . [ disposi-
tions] is best maximised if true contradictions are allowed . . . pro-
vided we abhor contradictions in the way earlier discussed, it is . . . ,
I would argue, not likely.
Unfortunately, what argument Eklund would give, we are left guessing. Opti-
misation, by its nature, depends on the inter-relation of many factors. It is not
determined by any one of them.
Why might one suppose that the  is likely to be preserved in the opti-
misation process? Eklund waves at entrenchment. The question, then, is this:
What does it mean to say that the Law is entrenched? The entrenchment of
the Law could mean that it is very strongly believed (by many people). This
may be true.10 But it can hardly be maintained that high weight should be
given to the Law simply for that reason. Consider the insane man who be-
lieves, very strongly but groundlessly, that he is a saucepan: maybe he is also
disposed to believe that he is not saucepan-shaped (because he can see this). In
a consistent optimisation of his beliefs, one would hardly want to weight the
belief that he is a saucepan higher simply because it is the stronger belief.
9Actually, it is not obvious that the  is even a candidate for being preserved in the op-
timisation process. That many people have a disposition to assert the  may be obvious,
but recall that what is to be maximised are those sentences that speakers have a disposition
to accept in virtue of their linguistic competence. And it might be suggested that the dispositions
concerning the  are not part of this competence at all—simply the result of some process of
education (or indoctrination).
10Though one may certainly contest this. Arguably, what most people believe is a restricted
version of the , a principle (schema) defined only over the T -free fragment—or, at best, only
over the ‘grounded’ fragment. It is difficult to accept that most people would readily accept the
 if, contrary to fact, they (most people) were fully aware of Liar-like sentences. (It’s very easy
to accept the  if one’s stock of potential counterexamples ignores the semantic paradoxes!)
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Presumably, then, it is not simply the strength of the belief that is impor-
tant, but the rationality of the belief. Now, is belief in the  so rational?
Well, many people assume so; but assuming so does not make it so. And when
we review the reasons for the Law, they are (to put it mildly) disappointing.
The only sustained defence of the law that there has ever been is Aristotle’s
in book Gamma of the Metaphysics. And this is terrible.11 Reasons of a non-
question-begging kind seem hard to come by. The honest view is that the Law
is not rationally grounded.12 Eklund, at an rate, does not even attempt to pro-
vide a defence of the rationality of the Law.
Another possibility is that entrenchment should be understood as some-
thing like centrality to the web of belief, in Quine’s sense. How to cash out
this idea is not an easy question either. As a first cut, it is something like
this: a belief is central if its revision would occasion a drastic modification of
the whole web of beliefs. (In one of Quine’s pithy dictums, when modifying
the web we should adopt a maxim of minimum mutilation.) This is obviously
vague, and it is not clear how to explicate the notion of a drastic modification
in a satisfactory way. However, the account will suffice for the present. The
question now is whether the  is central in this sense.
The centrality of the  is often asserted (without backing). But is the
 central? No. The reason is as follows. A paraconsistent logician has ways
of simply subsuming any reasoning that is acceptable to a classical logician.
We will not go into all the details here,13 but the basic idea is this. A para-
consistent logician, if reasoning about a consistent situation, can use classical
logic (in much the way that an intuitionist logician can use classical logic when
reasoning about finite situations). Classical logic is just the special case of para-
consistent logic (at least its extensional part) restricted to consistent situations.
Now, the only situations that make sense from a classical perspective are con-
sistent ones. Hence, reasoning about any situation that makes sense from a
classical perspective makes sense from a paraconsistent perspective also. It is
just that from a paraconsistent perspective there will be other situations about
which we can reason, which make no sense from a classical perspective. The
effects of rejecting the , then, are not at all as drastic as one might have
been supposed. In just the way that the discovery of another country does not
affect our beliefs about this country, the discovery of inconsistent situations
does not affect our beliefs about consistent situations.
Even if the  were entrenched in any of the senses we have been dis-
cussing, it would still not be at all obvious that in a process of optimisation it
will be retained. Many small factors can, after all, outweigh one big factor. And
beliefs that are entrenched are reasonably jettisoned sometimes. The beliefs
that the earth is stationary, or that biological species are fixed, would seem to
11This claim is backed up in detail in Priest (1998).
12Again, this view is backed up in detail in Priest (2001).
13They can be found in Priest (1987), ch. 8.
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be just such beliefs.
And there are certainly factors that speak against the Law, many of them
not so small.14 Thus, on nearly everyone’s view of what counts as a good opti-
misation, simplicity is a major desideratum. What, exactly, simplicity amounts
to is a moot point. But, on pretty much any understanding of the notion, a
paraconsistent logic such as LP plus the naive account of truth (that is, one
that endorses all the inferences from a sentence to its truth, and vice versa) is
simpler than all consistent accounts of truth, based, as they tend to be, on com-
plex ordinal hierarchies, not to mention the further ad hoc hypotheses needed
to avoid problems about strengthened forms of the liar paradox.15
Finally, note the following. We have been talking, so far, as though in the
optimisation process one has to choose between inconsistency and the .
One does not. If one subscribes to a paraconsistent logic one can have every
instance of the Law, ¬(A∧ ¬A), together with sentences of the form A and ¬A
(maybe because one also endorses all instances of the T -schema).16 Whatever
sentence is taken to express the , one can accept that and some contra-
dictions as well. If you really want to maximise dispositions, this is the way
to go.17 Of course, there will be some things that cannot then be endorsed.
The most obvious of these is the conditional (A∧¬A)→ B (assuming that the
maximisation also endorses modus ponens). But recall that we are supposed to
be maximising those sentences which semantic competence requires a disposi-
tion to accept. And the conditionals in question are hardly of this kind. Most
native speakers are not just disposed not to accept these conditionals: they are
disposed to reject them. We do not take this as a mark that the speakers do not
understand conditionals. If these considerations are right, then the process
that maximises those sentences that we are disposed to accept in virtue of our
semantic consequence will not require the rejection of anything. You can have
your inconsistent cake and eat it too.
It might be suggested that, just because it is possible to endorse ¬(A∧¬A)
and a contradition, this sentence is not really an expression of the Law of Non-
Contradicition at all. The Law cannot be captured by accepting or endorsing
any sentence; it is to be captured by rejecting—by rejecting any claim of the
14This case is argued further in Priest (2001).
15While we are on the topic of adhocness, Eklund claims (p. 327) that disendorsing the ,
as the dialetheists does, is just as ad hoc as many consistency-preserving moves. Well, maybe this
depends on what ‘ad hoc’ means, but the claim is pretty odd. Suppose that you believe in the
existence of God, and I provide an argument against it, as a result of which you abandon your
view. Your reaction is not, in any standard sense, ad hoc. The same is the case if you disendorse
the  as a result of the liar argument.
16In particular, one may, as some dialetheists (e.g., Beall) do, have the validity of both¬(T〈A〉∧
¬T〈A〉) and ¬(T〈A〉 ∧ T〈¬A〉), and also, for some A, T〈A〉 ∧ ¬T〈A〉 ∧ T〈¬A〉. This is especially
attractive—indeed, dictated—by a ‘transparent’ (disquotationalist) theory of truth. See Beall
(2004, 2005).
17Eklund (p. 330) appears to think that you cannot have it both ways.
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formA∧¬A.18 We agree that such a rejecting is something that has a legitimate
claim to be called a version of the Law of Non-Contradiction. We also agree
that one cannot respect both a disposition of this kind and a disposition to
accept a contradiction. We note only that appealing to the notion of rejection
at this point is not a move open to Eklund, since he characterises semantic
competence explicitly in terms of acceptance, and acceptance only. Could his
framework be modified to incorporate rejection as well? Possibly; possibly not.
It is certainly a natural enough thought that semantic competence may involve
rejection, though working out the details of an appropriate story is another
matter. As for optimisation, even without rejection to worry about, this is a
mirky enough notion; when rejection is thrown into the mix, it is not at all
clear how it should be supposed to work. Anyway, we are happy to leave this
as a problem for Eklund to worry about if he wishes. Even if this is resolved
satisfactorily, all our other points remain.
6 :    
We have now reviewed Eklund’s attack on dialetheism. It is based on a distinc-
tion about which one might well have one’s doubts and, at the very least, about
which there are pressing questions. But even given the distinction, the main
thrust of Eklund’s argument is an ignoratio. The case for dialetheism based on
the liar paradox depends upon the truth of the T -schema, not its analyticity.
Eklund gives us no theory of truth. In a sense, then, there is nothing in the
paper to answer. We can interpret his comments about optimisation as an ar-
gument to the effect that the correct account of truth is consistent. But this
amounts to little more than an uncritical assumption: it is not seriously argued;
and we have seen there are reasons to suppose that optimisation of the kind
in question is more likely to result in inconsistency than consistency. In short,
Eklund’s attack on dialetheism is not a profound one; his view is not so deep
consistency.
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